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Grutter and Gratz.
Michael Higginbotham"
Kathleen Bergin
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT...
We have demonstrated that the University ofMichigan, both at its
undergraduate institution and its law school, can operate flexible
admissions programs, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, that competitively weigh each
applicant's academic background, life experiences, and personal
characteristics, including race. By constitutional standards, their
purpose of promoting a diverse student body is a compelling interest,
and by considering a candidate's race along with other personal
characteristics, the programs are appropriately tailored. Both as to
purpose and scope, the University has satisfied its equal-protection
obligation.
THE UNIVERSITY'S ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS
Each year the University's undergraduate and law schools receive
hundreds of applications from qualified students that exceed the
number of available admission slots. After the University ranks each
candidate's standardized test score and grade-point average, some
applicants advance their standing based upon geographic origin,
residency status, leadership skills, work experience, relationship to
alumni, and other attributes. It is undisputed that such factors
disproportionately increase admission rates for white students at the
expense of minority students, even though some of these factors
reveal nothing about a candidate's merit or potential.
To level the playing field, the University also considers an
applicant's race, along with the other factors, as a means of increasing
student diversity, without relying on quotas, set-asides, or separate
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admission tracks. This comprehensive approach promotes
enrollment of students with all types of backgrounds, including
students from racial groups noticeably underrepresented on campus.
STUDENT DIVERSITY Is A COMPELLING INTEREST
We remind your Honors that this Court is not facing a novel
question. In 1978, it was decided in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke' that a university can properly integrate its
student body by considering an applicant's racial background
among a multitude of other factors when making admission
decisions. At issue in Bakke was the admissions program at the
medical school of the University of California at Davis that reserved
16 out of 100 entering seats exclusively for qualified minority
applicants. Writing for a divided court, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
concluded that the program operated as an impermissible two-track
system because nonminorities could not compete for the reserved
seats.2
But while rejecting Davis's unyielding emphasis on race, Justice
Powell endorsed the flexible use of race alongside other factors to
further the "compelling state interest" of student diversity. As a
case in point, Justice Powell pointed to the policy at Harvard
College which, unlike Davis, considered race "a 'plus' in a
particular applicant's file," yet did not "insulate the individual from
comparison with all other candidates for the available seats."3
Under this plan, race might "tip the balance" in one applicant's
favor, just as other variables tip the balance for a competing
candidate.4 In this case, the University of Michigan takes the same
approach.
For Justice Powell, Davis's plan was deficient by its means, not
in its purpose. As he explained, the First Amendment embraced
the underlying goal of racial diversity. Justice Powell, quoting a
reference by Justice Felix Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
reasoned that the freedoms expressed in our Constitution have
significant value to educational institutions-which, unlike profit-
driven businesses, are authorized to promote an environment
"conducive to speculation, experiment and creation."5 In addition,
when sufficiently integrated, such an environment enables students
to develop the cultural and interpersonal skills necessary to succeed
1. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
2. Id. at 315, 98 S. Ct. at 2761.
3. Id. at 317, 98 S. Ct. at 2762.
4. Id. at 316, 98 S. Ct. at 2761.
5. Id. at 312, 98 S. Ct. at 2759 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 263, 77 S. Ct. 1203, 1218 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result).
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in a shrinking global community. Such reasoning persauded Justice
Powell that racial diversity is "of paramount importance" in the
fulfillment of a university's educational mission.
BAKKE'S PRECEDENTIAL VALUE
That a majority of justices joined only part of Justice Powell's
decision does not undermine the value of Bakke's reasoning. We
remind your Honors that four Justices in Bakke would have upheld
the Davis program, albeit under different standards of review.
Furthermore, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor confirmed the
significance of Bakke when she explained in Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education7 that a "state interest in the promotion of racial
diversity has been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the
context of higher education, to support the use of racial
considerations in furthering that interest." To ignore Bakke at this
late juncture not only risks resegregating America's colleges and
universities, but conflicts with this court's own commitment to stare
decisis.
Indeed, like many educational institutions across the country, the
University understands that diversity is most effectively achieved
when admissions criteria include race.9 In that respect, Bakke falls
within the line of cases that remain controlling in part because they
provide a source of reference. In Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies,
Incorporated v. Dobson'° and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey," this court declined to invalidate previous
decisions-Southland Corporation v. Keating 2 and Roe v. Wade,'
3
respectively-because they so profoundly influenced institutional and
individual decision makers. Bakke has engendered the same reliance
from individuals, educational institutions, and government entities.
Regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of Education take
full account of Bakke and its endorsement of racial diversity.
Only when a recent precedent departs from well-established
principles has this Court taken the extraordinary step of overruling
itself to restore a prior line ofjurisprudence.' 4 Here, the Court faces
6. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313, 98 S. Ct. at 2760.
7. 476 U.S. 267, 286, 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1853 (1986).
8. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15, 98 S. Ct. at
2759-61).
9. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 735 (6th Cir. 2002).
10. 53 U.S. 265, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
11. 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
12. 465 U.S. 1, 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984).
13. 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
14. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 233-34, 115 S. Ct.
2097, 2115-16 (1995) (overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S.
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no such conflict. First, Bakke itself established the controlling
precedent on diversity so there is no prior precedent to re-establish.
In addition, 25 years after Justice Powell announced the compelling
nature of diversity, and 17 years after Justice O'Connor reaffirmed
that rule, Bakke continues to influence admissions policies
nationwide. Borrowing the rationale in Casey, Bakke cannot be
overruled "without serious inequity to those who have relied upon it
or significant damage to the stability of the society governed by it."' 5
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has already upheld
the law school's plan based in part on this reasoning.
Moreover, this Court has never rejected diversity as a compelling
interest nor suggested that only programs designed to remedy
discrimination are compelling enough to satisfy constitutional
standards. Wygant,"6 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 7 City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Company18 and Adarand,9 each dealt with varying types
of race-based remedies for discrimination, but not one articulated the
radical notion that race was relevant to remedial interests, but no
other.
NARROW TAILORING AND DIVERSITY
The petitioners in the University of Michigan cases, Jennifer
Gratz and Barbara Grutter, argue that even if diversity constitutes a
compelling interest, the admissions programs nonetheless fail because
they are not "narrowly tailored." We submit that a narrow-tailoring
requirement is inappropriate in this case.
Narrow tailoring makes sense where race-based remedies are
concerned because it provides compensation to actual victims of
racial discrimination without risking a windfall to undeserving non-
victims. That is why this Court rejected a remedial construction set-
aside program in Croson that reserved a percentage of public works
contracts for minority-owned businesses, but gave a competitive
advantage to minority business owners who had never been denied a
government contract on account of their race.20
By definition, a diversity-based program cannot be overbroad. Its
goal is not meant to provide proportional compensation for prior
wrongs. As implied in Bakke, student body diversity is, by its nature,
somewhat mathematically imprecise because it stems from a desire
547, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990)).
15. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855, 112 S. Ct. at 2809.
16. 476 U.S. 267, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
17. 448 U.S. 448, 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980).
18. 488 U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
19. 515 U.S. 200, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
20. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
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to advance the educational mission. Unlike remedies for
discrimination, diversity does not require proportionality.
Even applying narrow tailoring, the University's admissions
programs meet that standard. Narrow tailoring requires an assessment
of whether the "plus" factor is "too big." The size of the plus factor,
whether for race, geography, or alumni relationship, reflects the
institution's commitment to qualified applicants with a particular
characteristic. The very reason that racial quotas are problematic is
because it is difficult to select the "right" number with mathematical
precision. Instead, this Court must respect both the judgment and
experience ofUniversity officials in evaluating whether, in comparison
to other factors, race is over emphasized. Under the University's
admissions programs, the race factor is hardly excessive. At the
undergraduate level, the University assigns the same number of points
to applicants from underrepresented minority groups as it does to
socially and economically disadvantaged applicants, athletes, and any
other applicant for any reason at the Provost's discretion. The law
school, without relying on a point system, weighs race fairly by placing
it on an equal footing with other potential student contributions.
In that respect, the University's plan disproves the petitioners'
argument that the program gives advantages disproportionately to
minority students. On the contrary, although the University's flexible
consideration of race contributes to a diverse student body, it did not
unfavorably disadvantage either the undergraduate or law school
petitioners because they would not have been admitted even under a
race-blind policy. On the whole, the University was less impressed
with the petitioners' credentials than those of applicants who received
admission offers, including dozens of white applicants who had lower
GPA's and standardized test scores than the petitioners. Furthemoie,
the racial diversity the university seeks is well defined when compared
to the types of diversity in other contexts that some members of this
court have labeled "too amorphous, too insubstantial and too unrelated"
to any legitimate basis for employing racial classifications. For
example, in Metro Broadcasting, Incorporated v. F.C.C.,21 several
Justices chided the Federal Communications Commission for
attempting to broaden the scope of viewpoints expressed during
broadcast programming by increasing minority broadcast licensing.
Those Justices declined to assume a correlation between the number of
minority license holders and broadcast diversity. To do so, Justice
O'Connor explained, equates "race with belief and behavior" and
overlooks the range of ideologies that exist among individuals of the
same race.
22
21. 497 U.S. 547, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
22. Id. at 618, 110 S. Ct. at 3037 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Contrary to the FCC, the University values intra-racial as well as
inter-racial diversity and understands that underrepresented minority
students bring to campus a range of experiences, values, and
ideologies, not only in comparison to non-minority students, but also
in comparison to each other. In an environment that promotes this
type of diversity, some minority students might find more in common
with their non-minority classmates than members of their own race.
The University operates from a premise that there is no such thing as
a "Black mindset" or "Hispanic mindset," and seeks to inculcate this
understanding among its students by fostering the admission of
underrepresented applicants.
Moreover, just as Bakke encouraged universities around the
Nation to pursue diversity, Justice Powell's comparison between the
programs at Harvard and Davis instructed them on how to undertake
that pursuit within the strictures of the Constitution. This Court
should not forget how minority enrollment in California, Washington,
and Texas universities plummeted following court imposed or
legislatively mandated race-blind admissions. Bakke has instructed
universities on how to maintain a meaningful minority presence with
little, or in this case, no consequence to Petitioners.
Finally, even if the "plus" factor is not too big and the negative
impact on those not covered by the affirmative action program is
minimal, the petitioners argue that narrow tailoring requires proof that
the compelling objective cannot be achieved through less burdensome
alternatives than the consideration of race. Petitioners point to the
implementation of race-neutral programs in Texas and Florida that
guarantee university admissions at highly selective campuses to the
top students from each high school in the state. However, race-
neutral affirmative action programs, such as those based solely on
socio-economic standards, are ineffective because they prevent
universities from achieving the critical mass necessary for a racially-
diverse student body. Since whites tend to outnumber minorities
qualifying for such programs, overall minority enrollment is reduced
by such race-neutral methods. Moreover, a percentage program
would be unworkable at the law school level.
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN EDUCATION
This Court has repeatedly acknowledged the unique and important
influence of education in American society.23 As a way of
safeguarding that role, as well as upholding federalist principles, the
court has granted wide deference to educational institutions and the
23. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954);
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
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state governments that control them. As a result, colleges and
universities enjoy broad powers to carry out their educational
missions.24 Allowing the University flexibility in promoting racial
diversity recognizes that valuable role.
CONCLUSION
Justice Powell concluded in Bakke that "[t]he Nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of
tongues. ... "'25 The University has created a diverse student body
that allows for just such discovery which in turn enhances the
learning environment of the entire student body. The means by which
the University has chosen to achieve this goal is consistent with the
letter and spirit of this Court's prior decisions and the guarantees of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We trust
that the Court will not prevent the University from continuing this
indispensable service.
24. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16, 91 S.
Ct. 1267, 1276 (1971).
25. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,312,98 S. Ct. 2733,
2760 (1978) (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943).

